Why electricity transmission cost benchmarking is difficult?

Quick Answer

Great Britain’s three transmission owners forecast a 6% underspend against their RIIO-ET2 totex allowances over the five-year period, and sat 12% below allowance across the first four years. On the same data, they expect to deliver between 72% and 82% of the asset volumes the price control assumed. The underspend and the shortfall are not two issues. They are two different ways of describing the same situation. One shows how less money was spent. The other shows how much less was delivered. They come from the underlying problem.

Efficiency assessment is the work of telling the two apart. For a transmission company that work is hard: there is no domestic competitor, so the comparator set has to be assembled across borders, from fewer than ninety cost observations, against metrics that have to be chosen rather than read off. And it arrives late. The most recent pan-European benchmark reports on data that ends in 2020.

Key takeaways

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  • Spending below allowance says nothing on its own. Set against delivery, the Great Britain picture inverts: Scottish Hydro Electric Transmission reports a 7% underspend that becomes an anticipated £31m overspend once end-of-period adjustments are applied.
  • Efficiency here means technical efficiency: expenditure against concrete network metrics. Service quality is pursued separately, through incentive schemes.
  • The comparator set is the binding constraint. The two most recent pan-European benchmarks rest on 81 and 87 cost observations, which rules out some methods and makes outlier screening decisive: TCB18 screened out four of seventeen operators.
  • The signal arrives late. The most recent benchmark reports on data ending in 2020, a gap of four and a half years to publication and five years to use in a 2025 price control review.
  • Despite these limitations, benchmarking remains useful: the alternative is to assess a transmission company's costs without a meaningful external comparison. 

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Scope of this article

Efficiency assessment shows whether a transmission company’s costs match its operational need. It is difficult because there are only three onshore transmission owners in Great Britain, too few to form a comparator set, so the comparison has to be built from international data, from a small sample, against metrics that have to be chosen rather than read off.  

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Why does cost assessment matter for an electricity transmission company? 

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Because it is the only way to show that costs are tracking operational need rather than drifting away from it. A transmission company that can evidence this has a stronger case when raising capital and when arguing its forecasts in a price control review. A regulator needs the same evidence in reverse, to test historical performance, forward-looking allowances and the claims made in support of them.

There is no universal metric for efficiency. The benchmark has to be chosen deliberately, with a clear view of how the variables relate to each other. That choice has a direct bearing on the results: in the literature reviewed for the Netherlands Authority for Consumers and Markets, model misspecification has a significant effect on efficiency estimates, and the effect is worst in small samples.

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Which kind of efficiency does a price control measure? 

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Technical efficiency, which is what economic regulators concentrate on in a price control review. It relates output, here electricity transmitted, to cost. Output efficiency, or cost-effectiveness, relates service quality to cost, and is pursued through incentive schemes and other secondary mechanisms.

Throughout this series, efficiency means technical efficiency, and the comparison is expenditure against concrete network metrics such as circuit length, substations, transformer capacity, units transmitted and peak demand. Comparing expenditure with operational scale provides the basis for assessing whether a company's costs are proportionate to its network. 

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Figure 1: Cost and operational metrics matrix

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Operational metrics: circuit length, substations, transformer capacity, units transmitted and peak demand. Hover or tap a quadrant to read it.

Source: MCC Economics & Finance.

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What it shows: Two of the four quadrants carry a clear reading. The amber pair say only that cost and operational scale are moving together, which is what you would expect of any network. The choice of operational metric decides which quadrant a company lands in.

Only two of the four quadrants carry a clear reading. The amber pair say that cost and operational scale are moving together, which is what you would expect and settles nothing. That is why the choice of operational metric does so much work, and why the rest of this article is about choosing it.

Does spending less than your allowance make you efficient?

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No, and the current Great Britain data shows why. The three onshore transmission owners expect to finish RIIO-ET2 6% below their adjusted totex allowances, and were 12% below across the first four years. Read on its own, that looks like efficiency.

Set against output delivery it looks different. Ofgem’s owni figure for forecast asset volume delivery puts all three short of the volumes anticipated when the price control was set, by 28%, 18% and 23% respectively. And the adjusted view changes it again: Scottish Hydro Electric Transmission reports a 7% underspend that, once expected end-of-period adjustments are applied, becomes an anticipated overspend of £31m.

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Figure 2: Forecast totex spend against forecast asset volume delivery, RIIO-ET2

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Source: Ofgem (2026), Table 24 (page 32) and Figure 5 (page 23). Spend shares are 100% less the forecast underspend.

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What it shows: Money spent and work delivered, both as a share of what the price control assumed. All three owners expect to spend between 93% and 99% of their five-year allowance while delivering between 72% and 82% of the asset volumes.

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Table 1: Underspending an allowance is not the same as being efficient. Great Britain transmission owners, RIIO-ET2

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Transmission ownerFive-year totex forecast (Ofgem, Table 24)Cumulative, years 1 to 4Company view, five-yearAfter end-of-period adjustmentsAsset volumes forecast delivered
National Grid Electricity Transmission1% underspend (£7.5bn against £7.6bn)7% underspend3% underspend, £235mAbout £0.8bn of adjustments identified, £420m load-related and £395m non-load-related; a further £47m risk-metric reduction excludedAbout 72% of final determination volumes; 81% on the asset risk metric alone
ScottishPower Transmission5% underspend (£2.5bn against £2.7bn)13% underspend5% underspend, £140mNo estimates provided; about £50m net capital overspend before efficiency on projects spanning price controlsAbout 82% of anticipated volumes; 82.4% of the baseline network risk output on long-term risk benefit
Scottish Hydro Electric Transmission7% underspend (£3.5bn against £3.8bn)15% underspend7% underspend, about £0.3bn£31m overspend anticipated; £155m hand-back and £221m of spend proposed for re-phasing into RIIO-3About 77% of anticipated volumes; 95% of the monetised risk reduction target
All three6% underspend12% underspend£1,760m of additional allowances awarded through re-openers, April 2021 to December 2025Forecast shortfalls of 28%, 18% and 23%

Source: Ofgem (2026), RIIO-2 Electricity Transmission Annual Report 2024 to 2025, Table 24 (page 32), Table 2 (page 5), company summaries (page 6), Figure 5 (page 23), pages 21, 25, 28 and 35 to 38. The National Grid adjustment total is MCC’s sum of the components Ofgem lists.

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What it shows: Totex positions are in 2018-19 prices. Ofgem publishes two five-year figures for National Grid Electricity Transmission, 1% in Table 24 and 3% in the key findings and company summary; the difference is the treatment of end-of-period adjustments, which only that company estimated. Volume shortfalls and monetised risk measures are not interchangeable, and diverge most for Scottish Hydro Electric Transmission.

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The figures also raise three points about how cost performance should be interpreted. 

  1. The allowance is revised as the price control progresses. Between April 2021 and December 2025, Ofgem awarded a further £1,760m of RIIO-ET2 allowances through re-opener mechanisms. Performance against allowance is measured against a target that moved during the period, which is a reason to read the percentage with care rather than a reason to discard it.
  2. The two numbers Ofgem publishes for National Grid Electricity Transmission differ. Table 24 shows a 1% five-year underspend; the key findings table and the company summary show 3%, or £235m. The difference is the treatment of end-of-period adjustments, for which only National Grid Electricity Transmission supplied estimates. The report presents both figures, using different treatments of those adjustments. 
  3. Delivery can be counted in volumes or in monetised risk, and the two diverge. Scottish Hydro Electric Transmission forecasts 77% of anticipated asset volumes but 95% of its monetised risk reduction target. ScottishPower Transmission forecasts 82.4% of its baseline network risk output measured by long-term risk benefit, against a volume shortfall of 18%. The choice of measure therefore has a material bearing on how delivery performance is judged. 

Why is a transmission company harder to benchmark than most firms?

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Because it has no competitors operating under the same conditions, so the comparator set has to be assembled across borders, which is a materially harder exercise than comparing firms within one market.

A meaningful comparison also has to account for conditions the company does not control. Asset age and geography affect operating cost and are hard to measure and standardise. Nor is operating cost the only usable metric: staff numbers test whether a company’s headcount is consistent with its needs.

The binding constraint is the size of the comparator set. TCB18 drew on 17 electricity transmission system operators across 15 countries, giving 81 cost observations for 2013 to 2017, within a wider project of 46 gas and electricity operators across 16 countries. TCB21 used 16 operators across 16 countries, with a maximum of 87 cost observations for 2016 to 2020 and 76 operator-years in most descriptive tables.

The sample also brings together operators of very different sizes. In TCB21 the smallest runs 1,037 circuit kilometres and the largest 39,116, a spread of 38 to 1 inside a sample of sixteen.

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Figure 3: Circuit length by operator, TCB21 electricity sample, 2020

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Source: Agrell, Bogetoft and Gautier (2025), CEER-TCB21 Model Specification ELEC, Table 3-1, page 9. Mean calculated by MCC Economics & Finance.

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What it shows: Sixteen operators, from 1,037 circuit kilometres to 39,116. The mean of 10,858 km describes none of them well, and the largest operator is more than twice the next largest. This is the comparator set from which a frontier has to be drawn.

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The limited number of observations also shaped the choice of benchmarking method. TCB18 did not use stochastic frontier analysis as its main instrument because the number of observations was too small for a full-scale application, and used data envelopment analysis instead. Outliers were screened on German incentive regulation criteria, through super-efficiency and sums-of-squares tests. One operator was removed permanently as an extreme outlier and three more were identified by the model-specific tests, making four frontier outliers out of seventeen. On a sample that size the screening rule is not a technicality; it is a quarter of the sample. 

How many cost drivers can a small sample carry?

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Fewer than you would like, which is why the cost driver choice has to be argued from the engineering and the economics rather than discovered by fitting.

Data envelopment analysis offers no guidance at all on which variables to use, and it loses the power to discriminate between efficient and inefficient firms as the number of inputs and outputs rises, most sharply when the sample is small. The rule of thumb in the literature is that the number of inputs multiplied by the number of outputs should not exceed the sample size, and that the two added together should not exceed a third of it.

TCB18 settled on one input and three outputs: a normalised grid measure weighted by land use area, total installed transformer power, and circuit length weighted by the share of angular and steel towers. Four variables against seventeen operators clears both thresholds, and clears the project’s own convention of three times the number of inputs and outputs, with five observations to spare. There is no room in that budget for a fourth driver.

What the three drivers buy is most of the variation in cost.

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Figure 4: Explanatory power of the TCB18 cost drivers, robust regressions, n = 81

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Source: CEER and Sumicsid (2019), CEER-TCB18 Final Report Electricity, Table 5-3, page 35. Adjusted R-squared, robust regressions, n = 81.

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What it shows: The normalised grid measure alone explains 95.0% of the variation in totex. Adding transformer power takes the fit to 97.0%, and adding the tower-weighted line length to 97.8%.

The normalised grid measure alone explains 95% of the variation in totex; the other two add 2.8 percentage points between them. That is an argument for parsimony and a warning at the same time. A model that fits this well on four variables will still miss anything the four variables cannot see.

The scale of the choice becomes clear from the wider literature. Across fourteen studies of electricity transmission published between 1978 and 2014, thirty-five different output variables appear, and most of them appear once. There is no settled answer to what an electricity transmission company produces.

What does the efficiency frontier fail to see?

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The conditions that operators say they cannot control, and that the model cannot separate from the choices they make.

TCB18 invited operators to claim special conditions not captured by the model. Eight did, submitting twenty-five claims; sixteen were rejected and nine were investigated, and none of the nine became a separate cost driver, their effects being absorbed by correlation with variables already in the model. These were genuine cost pressures, but the model did not treat them as independent drivers. Their effects were already reflected in other variables. 

The difficulty was even greater when it came to service quality. CEER ran two surveys to find a quality metric that was universally relevant, measurable and verifiable. Responses came from two operators the first time and remained low and diverse the second time, and no quality parameter entered the model. The same pattern appears in the wider literature, where most studies disregard operating environment differences altogether.

So the frontier is drawn on costs and physical assets, corrected for land use, topography and soil through the normalised grid, and silent on everything else. This is an important limitation when using the benchmark to determine how much a company should be allowed to spend.

How late does the signal arrive?

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Two years at best, four and a half at worst, and five by the time anyone uses it.

TCB18 reported on 17 July 2019 on data ending in 2017, a two-year gap. TCB21 carries a release date of 31 July 2024 and a final report dated 21 January 2025, on data ending in 2020: four and a half years. A regulator consulting the most recent pan-European benchmark during a 2025 price control review was working from evidence five years old.

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Figure 5: The gap between the data and the verdict

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What it shows: The lag is structural. Data has to be collected under common definitions, validated nationally, cross-validated centrally and then modelled. TCB18 ran from December 2017 to June 2019 on data that was already two years old when the project started.

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Table 2: The two most recent pan-European electricity transmission benchmarks compared

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TCB18TCB21
Operators17 electricity transmission system operators16 electricity transmission system operators
Countries1516
Data period2013 to 20172016 to 2020
Cost observations81Maximum 87, with 76 operator-years in most descriptive tables
Size range in the sampleNot published in the open report1,037 to 39,116 circuit km, Cyprus to Spain
Cost baseTotex: operating expenditure plus annuitised capital expenditure, excluding energy and out-of-scope activitiesTotex: operating and capital expenditure standardised under the project comparability note
Frontier methodData envelopment analysis. Stochastic frontier analysis was not used as the main instrument because the sample was too small for a full-scale applicationData envelopment analysis, with stochastic frontier analysis, cross-efficiency analysis, robust and peeling variants and directional operating and capital models as robustness checks
ScreeningGerman incentive regulation criteria: super-efficiency and sums-of-squares tests. Four frontier outliers of seventeenThree screens: statistical properties, robustness to changes in the estimation set, and relevance for regulatory use
Published electricity resultMean cost efficiency 89.8% for 2017, median 0.991, lower quartile 0.795; four best-practice peers; about 10% efficiency potentialAggregate scores are not given in the open model specification note; individual results were issued to each operator and its regulator
Prepared bySumicsid for CEERPer Agrell, Peter Bogetoft and Axel Gautier, Sumicsid Group, for the CEER TCB21 Project Steering Group
DatesReleased 17 July 2019Release date 31 July 2024; final report dated 21 January 2025

Source: CEER and Sumicsid (2019), CEER-TCB18 Final Report Electricity; Agrell, Bogetoft and Gautier (2025), CEER-TCB21 Model Specification ELEC.

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What it shows: Both projects covered gas and electricity. TCB18 as a whole involved 46 operators across 16 countries; the figures above are the electricity samples.

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The time lag reflects the stages involved in producing a comparable benchmark. Data has to be collected from operators under common definitions, validated nationally, cross-validated centrally, then modelled. TCB18 ran from December 2017 to June 2019 on data already two years old when it started.

It is also about to be formalised, at least in gas. Article 19 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1789 requires ACER to publish a cost-efficiency comparison of gas transmission system operators, the first by 5 August 2027 and then every four years, with national regulators obliged to take the results into account when setting allowed revenues. Electricity transmission has no equivalent standing requirement: TCB18 and TCB21 were CEER projects, run when the regulators involved chose to run them. A four-year statutory cycle fixes the cadence; it does not shorten the lag between the data and the verdict.

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So is international benchmarking worth doing?

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Yes, because it compares a company with peers rather than with nothing, and because the results are not trivial.

TCB18 reported mean cost efficiency of 89.8% for 2017, with four best-practice peers and four screened-out outliers. The distribution matters as much as the mean: the median operator scored 0.991 while the lower quartile sat at 0.795, so the average conceals a small group a long way from the frontier. On the model’s own arithmetic, operators could on average save 10.2% of benchmarked comparable totex, which the executive summary rounds to about ten per cent of total comparable expenditure.

The results still need to be interpreted in light of several limitations. Differences in regulatory practice, in mandates and statutory obligations, and in the variables that resist measurement all reduce comparability. Accounting for them as far as possible is what makes an assessment as accurate as it can be. An international benchmark gives a defensible range and a set of peers, with both the TCB18 and TCB21 teams emphasising the need to interpret the results in that context. 

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References

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  1. Agrell, P. J., Bogetoft, P., & Gautier, A. (2025). CEER-TCB21 model specification ELEC: Final report (Version 1.1). Sumicsid Group. https://www.ceer.eu/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2024-07-31-tcb21_note_modelspec_elec_V11_main.pdf
  2. Council of European Energy Regulators. (2025). TSO cost efficiency benchmark TCB21: Model specification electricity. https://www.ceer.eu/publication/tso-cost-efficiency-benchmark-tcb21-model-specification-electricity/
  3. Council of European Energy Regulators, & Sumicsid. (2019). Pan-European cost-efficiency benchmark for electricity transmission system operators: Main report (Project CEER-TCB18, Version 1.2). https://www.ceer.eu/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/TCB18_final_report_elec_190717.pdf
  4. European Union Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators. (2025a). ACER efficiency comparison (AEC) for natural gas transmission system operators: Summary, phase 1. https://www.acer.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/Publications_annex/2025-AEC-Summary-Phase-1.pdf
  5. European Union Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators. (2025b). Public consultation on the ACER gas TSO cost efficiency comparison draft methodology (PC_2025_G_04). https://www.acer.europa.eu/public-consultation/pc2025g04-public-consultation-acer-gas-tso-cost-efficiency-comparison-draft-methodology
  6. Lawrence, D., Fallon, J., Cunningham, M., Zelenyuk, V., & Hirschberg, J. (2017). Topics in efficiency benchmarking of energy networks: Selecting cost drivers. Economic Insights. https://www.acm.nl/sites/default/files/documents/economic-insights-topics-in-efficiency-benchmarking-of-energy-networks-selecting-cost-drivers.pdf
  7. Office of Gas and Electricity Markets. (2026a). RIIO-2 electricity transmission: Annual report 2024 to 2025. https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/sites/default/files/2026-01/Annual_Report_ET_strategy.pdf
  8. Office of Gas and Electricity Markets. (2026b). RIIO-2 electricity transmission: Appendix to the annual report 2024 to 2025. https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/sites/default/files/2026-01/ET_annual_report_2024-25_Appendix.pdf
  9. Office of Gas and Electricity Markets. (2026c). RIIO-2 electricity transmission: Supplementary datafile 2024 to 2025. https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/sites/default/files/2026-01/ET_annual_report_2024_25_Supplementary_datafile.xlsx
  10. Regulation (EU) 2024/1789 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on the internal markets for renewable gas, natural gas and hydrogen, art. 19.

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